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Abstract:
Although indispensable and in daily use, money and more specifically 
money creation in our two-layered fractional reserve banking system is still 
poorly recognized by social science at large. Its main features are outlined 
in order to identify (a) money’s double nature to be private and public at 
once and (b) inflation and speculative excess as two of its inherent dangers. 
Bitcoin and sovereign money are discussed as prominent examples of, on 
the one hand, private or libertarian and, on the other hand state-oriented or 
social-democratic monetary reforms, each intended to solve one of the two 
systemic problems our currency order. The new money’s respective advan-
tages notwithstanding, it is shown that neither Bitcoin nor sovereign money 
can overcome money’s double nature or realize the dream of an eventually 
neutral money.
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Our money finds itself in a crisis. With this, it is not only meant that as of 
recently the euro’s survival has seemed to be threatened and, as a matter of 
fact, continues to be (Scharpf 2014). Moreover, our very monetary system 
being in crisis is a view not only shared by critics who on principle oppose 
capitalism (cf. Graeber 2011). In fact, doubts equally exist amongst generally 
market-friendly economists and amongst mentors and practitioners in the 
field of alternative economics about whether the constitution of our monetary 
order is able to meet both the economic and sociopolitical challenges of our 
time (cf. Emunds/Reichert 2013). Even the central banks are at their wits’ 
end and are seizing exceptional means in order to try and rescue a system 
that is in danger of getting out of control (cf. Esposito in this issue). 
This general criticism of money, albeit not necessarily in an anti-capitalist 
way, not only applies to the Eurozone but also to the monetary order itself; 
i.e. to our two-level monetary system with private commercial banks at its 
base and a politically independent central bank on the top. This monetary 
system, so the general tenor of the market-oriented critics, may not or no 
longer be in the position to provide the economy with ‘good money’, i.e. a 
medium enabling the exchange of goods and services and their production or 
its provision, instead of, as it seems or is in fact often the case, hindering it all.
Of course, the choir of money critics does not sing unanimously. Depending 
on the diagnosis of the central flaw(s) of the system, one arrives at different 
conclusions of what should be done (cf. Degens 2013; Dodd 2014, ch. 8). 
However, it is quite likely that the dream of an economy in which money 
simply facilitates the supposedly ‘proper’ economic activities of its actors, of 
a monetary system that works because it is not ‘felt’, will remain a dream, not 
only because our capitalist economy would never have come into being with-
out a previous or at least concomitant institutionalization of money (Ingham 
2004, ch. 5-6) or because finance as a technology to manage risk cannot be 
disposed of, but also because money cannot be reduced to being neither a 
form or derivative of private property nor a creature of the state (or any other 
community for that matter). In fact, it is both (Orléan 2011, 153-163).
The state cannot enforce the use of its currency for settling private deals 
– or if it could, it would lower the volume of trade which it can and must 
tax –, and the private actors, on the other hand, cannot invent a private cur-
rency without necessarily providing for third-party enforcement and moreover 
mechanisms to control, or rather maintain the belief in, its value (stability). 
Money, as any other institution, is a working fiction that depends on being 
treated as if it existed independently of the practical and cognitive acts that 
actually uphold it (Douglas 1987). What can be and actually is recurrently 
tested, however, is the degree to which this institution can be used to serve 
particular interests. While private owners of money preferably try to protect 
‘their’ money from political interferences, the state, on the other side, tries to 
assure its regulatory capacity, not necessarily in order to protect the common 
good, but also and simply to stay in the game. No wonder, then, that one can 
find divergent and even contradictory proposals to rectify a, at least from the 
point of view of its critics of one of the two camps, deficient currency order. 
[1] By opposing and comparing two of these proposals, namely Bitcoin and 
[1] Of course, neither all critique not all 
alternative money proposals can easily 
be classified as ‘private’ or state-oriented. 
There is at least a third ‘middle’ current of 
critique that could be labeled ‘communitar-
ian’ (cf. Degens in this issue).
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sovereign money, we might, however, get a better understanding of why it is 
rather unlikely that, even if our currency order is certain to evolve, seemingly 
radical reform proposals will in fact transcend the inherently contentious 
character of the institution of money.
Before I present and discuss first Bitcoin and then sovereign money, I 
will, however, assuming that some of the readers of this journal might not 
be well acquainted with the basic features of our current system of money 
creation and management (cf. Ingham 2007, ch. 7), quickly outline how it 
works and identify two specific problems which Bitcoin and sovereign money 
are supposed to solve.
I.
‘This note is legal tender for all debts, public or private’ is the sentence found 
on all dollar bills. The dollar is the legal means of payment in the USA, i.e. the 
American state guarantees that wherever American law applies, monetary 
contractual obligations can be amortized by payment of the sum in ques-
tion. The same goes for other state currencies. ‘Real money’ is solely money 
handed out by central banks, commissioned by the state. A fraction of this 
central bank money is being passed around in the form of cash. The rest of 
central bank money is being held by commercial banks – albeit not in the 
form of physical stocks but rather in the form, i.e. under the name, of so-
called reserves. Commercial banks get hold of central bank money by going 
into debt with the central bank and in return depositing securities for these 
credits. By deciding the level of the key interest rate, i.e. the rate at which 
commercial banks can get into debt with ‘its’ central bank, the latter influ-
ences the extent to which central bank money is in demand. Besides that, the 
central bank may increase the quantity of central bank money by means of 
buying up securities and, conversely, by selling securities from proprietary 
possession. In principle, the central bank is in a position to produce money 
‘out of nothing’, metaphorically speaking, to print money at discretion and, 
in reverse, to let money vanish ‘into nothing’ or annihilate earned cash.
The danger that is inherent to this special position of the central bank 
is obvious – and constitutes one of two systemic problems of our current 
monetary order I want to point out. The central bank can put more money 
into circulation than is actually needed by the economic stakeholders, and 
thus generate inflation (Hayek 1950). Equally problematic is the case of an 
under-supply of the economy with central bank money, so that generally 
sinking prices, or deflation, would not represent a decreasing need for goods 
but rather a general lack of money. A diachronic price comparison would be 
impossible in both cases, and misallocations would result. The legal mandate 
of the central banks is thus to observe the economic development of their 
respective currency area in an extensive and preferably forward-looking way 
in order to adapt the provided quantity of money to the present demand. 
Nevertheless, notwithstanding the deflationary world economic crisis of 1929 
1931, Japan’s deflationary economic troubles since the early 1990s and the 
possibly deflationary situation the Eurozone is currently in, it is the specter 
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of politically induced inflation and not deflation that haunts owners of capital 
and motivates the private or rather libertarian thread of monetary reform 
(Gedeon 1997).
Orthodox economic theory, or libertarianism for that matter, considers 
money to be nothing more than the exchange value that one owner of goods 
is willing to part with in exchange for other goods he or she desires. By having 
once secured the rights to minting coins out of gold or other precious metals 
national institutions performed the service of standardizing money, but at 
the same time they got hold of a position that allowed them to manipulate the 
standard of coins at their own discretion. Eventually, the misuse of money by 
the state or its agents went too far when materially unsecured paper money 
entered the picture. This enabled political authorities to create money at will 
and to thereby slowly but surely dispossess private money owners.
Thus, as a precondition for a central bank to fulfill its task of keeping 
the price level constant, political independence is supposed to be required 
(Nordhaus 1975). Basically, political independence means that the central 
bank cannot be instructed by the government to decrease or increase the 
quantity of money. Otherwise, the central bank could be ordered, independent 
of real growth rates, to activate the printing press in order to use the excess, 
i.e. unsecured money – to, ‘for example’, indirectly buy votes before elections 
take place. In fact, central bank independence has been institutionalized 
throughout the OECD-world and continues to be enshrined as the conditio 
sine qua non of monetary stability (McNamara 2002). To libertarians, how-
ever, even the formal independence of central banks has not fundamentally 
changed the situation. Up until this very day, central banks’ monetary policies 
inevitably depend on the stipulations of whoever is in power (Orléan 2008). 
Furthermore, economic players depend on putting faith not only in these 
political institutions but also in commercial financial intermediaries without 
having a direct commercial relation with them but rather with their respective 
business partners. Thus, according to libertarian critics of our present two 
layered banking system, public and private financial intermediaries appro-
priate money, that supposedly has once been invented by private economic 
players to simplify their trade and thus belongs to them only.
A further difficulty – a second key problem of our monetary order I want 
to single out – results from the fact that the creation of money by central 
banks represents only the first, respectively the last, link of a significantly 
longer chain of money creation (McLeay et al. 2014). Commercial banks as 
debtors of central banks and recipients of central bank money do not simply 
pass it on to their commercial and private clients but instead use it in order 
to provide a security for their book money, which they may have already 
created via current account or book crediting. Book money creation means 
that the banks grant credits to their clients for settling their own liabilities 
towards other economic stakeholders. The debtor of a bank might request his 
credit to be paid out in cash; in practice, however, he most likely will settle his 
payable liabilities by transferring a part of his book money to a third party. 
Book money is treated by bank clients as cash. Ultimately, also the receiver 
of a book money transfer will only rarely ask for a disbursement of the sum 
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accredited to his account. Therefore, banks only have to hold a fraction of 
their accredited book money available in cash.
In order for a change from book money to cash to be able to nonetheless 
take place in individual cases, legal minimum reserve rules exist. In text-
books about banking and finance practice, money creation is often explained 
with the help of the money multiplier (cf. Krugman/Wells 2009, 393-396). 
According to this model, a mandatory minimum reserve of, for example, 10% 
would allow a commercial bank to lend 900 euros in cash out of an amount 
of 1,000 euros in its possession. These 1,000 euros may be borrowed either 
from the central bank or from savers. As soon as the 900 euros lent are paid 
into a further commercial bank, this bank may lend 810 euros of the amount 
to the next; 90 euros need to be held available as cash. In this way, the series 
continues so that on the base of 1,000 euros in cash, eventually 10,000 euros 
of book money can be created. Within this explanatory frame, the central bank 
would be capable of limiting the money creation of the commercial banks via 
the mechanism of the minimum reserve. However, this explanation is wrong 
or at least skewed, not because there aren’t any minimum reserve rules or 
banks do not comply, but rather because book money creation precedes the 
deposit of reserves. As a matter of fact, credits are first and only as a reaction 
to this do commercial banks accommodate central bank money. They are 
able to do so because the central bank, responsible for preventing the credit 
business from crashing, stands by for providing the commercial banks with 
reserves anytime. Of course, the commercial banks have to pay interest to 
the central bank, the raison d’être of the deal, however, is that an even higher 
interest shall eventually be earned by lending out (parts of) the money. In 
practice, this means that commercial banks are almost indefinitely able to 
create book money.
As with politically dependent central banks, inflation might result and 
actually results, in this incidence, however, rather in the form of rising asset 
than rising consumer prices. In fact, the bulk of book money, which is rarely, or 
at least should not be, credited without the debtors procuring collateral, does 
not go towards consumption, but investive and/or speculative purposes. In 
times of low real growth and interest rates, a situation the Western world has 
now faced for more than two decades (Teulings/Baldwin 2014), book money 
or rather different book monies have been fueling the massive expansion of 
the financial sector. In order to ensure, on the one hand, that interest claims 
can be met and, on the other, that the total volume of credits can be further 
expanded, an ever-increasing number of financial ‘products’ were invented. 
At the heart of the financial markets breaking free, if we are to describe it as 
such, hides a circuit of ‘money production’ conducted by the banks that has 
spiraled out of control (Paul 2012, 9-44). It was already known before the 
last global financial crisis that the bursting of speculation bubbles can put 
the real economy in jeopardy (Fisher 1933). What counts in times of such 
crises is central bank money alone, precisely because bloated promises of 
payment then turn into obligations of payment. And as not only the last – 
and lasting – crisis made clear, it is the states that had to move in to rescue 
a system that got out of control. Thus, the main problem that the states, its 
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financial regulatory agencies and, not least, the social-democratic partisans 
of a political framing of capitalism are confronting is less ‘common’ inflation 
than speculative excess. This is the flaw in the system social-democratic 
monetary reformers want to rectify.
It goes without saying that the remedy one proposes must relate to the 
diagnosis. Those that fear that political manoeuvres undermine the value 
of money, despite the formal independence of central banks, will focus on 
the depolitization of money, whereas those who deplore the lacking capac-
ity of the state to control money creation will favour, conversely, a political 
taming of our monetary order. By discussing two examples of libertarian 
and social-democratic reform proposals, Bitcoin and sovereign money, it 
shall be shown that, if these projects, as in the case of Bitcoin, gain ground 
or, as in the case of sovereign money, should be implemented in the first 
place, the opposite of what is intended or at least substantial non-intended 
consequences will most likely ensue. Instead, one the hand, circumventing 
third-party encroachments on bilateral deals, there will be a return of the 
intermediation and regulation that should have been avoided. On the other 
hand, the ‘cleansing’ of the economy from fictitious enterprise will also stifle 
the real growth that should have been stimulated.
II.
In lieu of subjecting money to the political interests of national institutions, 
libertarians argue that it should revert back into the monetary good it is sup-
posed to have once been. Some call for a return to the gold standard (Paul 
2009). Others instead believe that the selection of the best currency ought 
to be left to the market. Hayek suggested a denationalization of currencies 
already in the 1970s (Hayek 1976; 1979): Private money distributors could 
simply offer different private currencies to market players. The currency 
which in practice proves to be the most stable in value would eventually 
dominate the market.
Essentially, due to the political power of economically prevalent states 
enabling them to hold on to their monetary monopolies, a currency competi-
tion as envisioned by Hayek has not become reality for decades. Advances in 
modern information processing and communication technology, however, 
have recently helped the libertarian dream of a denationalized currency to 
come true. Bitcoin is not the sole but the most successful virtual currency 
which, starting in 2009, has tried to compete with national currencies (Dodd 
2014, 362-372; Castronova 2014). Certainly, its attractiveness not only lies 
in its value being independent from national institutions. Over and above, 
the attractiveness of virtual currencies is deemed to be heightened by their 
easy handling, their counterfeit protection as well as the anonymity involved 
in their trading.
For a start, Bitcoin can be understood as a software that organizes a decen-
tralized computer network which allows subscribed users to either exchange 
units of value by delivering goods and services or to actually create these 
units of value (European Central Bank 2012, 21-24; Koenig 2016, ch. 5). The 
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transmission of bitcoins [2] takes place directly from one user to another; 
there are no intermediary institutions which might themselves profit from 
the transactions of payments. A bitcoin is a virtual unit of value composed 
of coded data strings that are not secured by any actual goods or physical 
values. Such a unit of value can be purchased in exchange for traditional 
currencies. There are stock markets just for the purpose of such exchanges. 
One trait of electronic data – and a bitcoin is nothing more than just that – is 
that it can be copied quite easily. In order to ensure that a bitcoin is not fake 
or has been spent more than once, a special safety mechanism is needed. 
This consists of the bitcoin changing its identity with each transaction in a 
way which makes all prior transactions traceable. Put differently, a bitcoin 
tells the story of where it or all its shares have been transferred to. Owners 
of a bitcoin at a particular point in time, however, remain anonymous; they 
too are encrypted into mere data strings. 
Of course, a bitcoin’s identity needs to be verifiable by all users of the cur-
rency in equal measures. This is achieved by both sides of a Bitcoin transac-
tion laying the bitcoins’ identity bare to the entire network and third parties 
subsequently putting an effort into the verification, i.e. the computational 
recapitulation of all of the past transactions of the bitcoins in question. Once 
this examination is over, the new bitcoin identities, expanded by a further 
transaction, are announced to the entire network. Hence the network has 
access to something that can be described as an all-encompassing, decentral-
ized and thus unforgeable main log – the so-called blockchain. The incentive 
for users not directly taking part in the transaction in question to control 
the bitcoins is that the user who is the quickest to verify the transaction is 
rewarded by the system with new bitcoins. Thus each transaction taking place 
also augments the total sum of bitcoins available within the entire system. 
To prevent an inflation of money, the amount of bitcoins that can be gained 
by means of verification decreases over time. Ever-increasing processing power 
is needed in order to add an entry to the main log. Moreover, the system is 
programmed for the last of a total of 21 million of bitcoins to be ‘mined’ in 
2040. As is the case with a currency secured by gold, the currency thus can-
not be created at will; however, in contrast to actual gold, of which more can 
always be found, the amount of bitcoins is limited right from the beginning. 
The production of bitcoins can neither be forced nor can the currency be 
inflated in the long run. In both cases an algorithm regulates and terminates 
the process of money creation. Maurer and colleagues (2013, 262) tellingly 
call this Bitcoin’s ‘digital metallism’.
The number of advantages, i.e. the currency’s assumed value stability, its 
apolitical status, its safety and anonymity as well as the absence of interme-
diaries, has adherents expecting that over the course of the following decades 
Bitcoin will come to eventually prevail against our deficient monetary order 
(Vigna/Casey 2015). However, on the one hand, the assumed advantages 
of an apolitical currency are contrasted by a fundamental disadvantage (cf. 
Weber 2016, 26-37), which, at the very least, puts the former into perspec-
tive. Furthermore, it can be demonstrated that key problems inherent to the 
current monetary system cannot be solved by Bitcoin, but simply resurface. 
[2] I refer to Bitcoin when the currency 
is meant and use bitcoin when I talk of 
its units.
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Much to the disadvantage of the currency, though most likely by intention, 
by deciding to limit the amount of bitcoins eventually available, the inventors 
of Bitcoin have built a deflationary bias into the system. In the long run, this 
is an unavoidable effect of limiting the number of bitcoins to 21 million. If a 
greater sum of goods is traded with a constant total amount of money, the 
prices of goods are bound to decrease. Such a fate would not be dramatic per 
se, if an average decrease in prices would not motivate consumers to post-
pone consumption to a later point in order to obtain a fuller shopping cart 
for the same price than would presently be the case. The mere fact that this 
restraint in consumption results in trade and, consequently, also production 
sinking, prompts today’s authorities in monetary policies to shy away more 
from deflation than from a slight inflation (Bernanke 2002). Bitcoin users 
are, admittedly, not merely promised a currency that is stable in value, but 
also one whose value increases. However, the price for such asset security 
will be a stagnation of the real economy.
Moreover, there are at least two structural contradictions in Bitcoin’s design 
for which the currency itself cannot be blamed, just as little, however, as 
they apply to established currencies only. The first objection is simple. Just 
as much as the blockchain technology intends to replace trust, users are 
asked to trust in the software they are using. Admittedly, Bitcoin is based 
on an open source code that can be checked by anyone. However, for most 
users, truly understanding this code might be as difficult as observing all 
inner workings of a traditional bank. The majority of users, therefore, only 
assume the system to be functioning, just as advertised by its proponents. 
Additional trust must be paid to one’s own hardware. If one’s own computer 
fails, makes mistakes, gets tracked or hacked, security goes down the drain. 
Put differently, in the case of Bitcoin, ‘system trust’ addressed to technology 
replaces trust in organizations, their statutes and personnel. At all events, 
trust continues to play a major role. 
The second contradiction stems from the most probable return of financial 
intermediaries and thus the rebirth of precisely a major part of the system 
that Bitcoin had been designed to abolish. After all, why should users who 
do not put sufficient trust into the security of their personal computers not 
turn to third parties for the storage of their bitcoins? Why should today’s 
banks not advertise funds containing bitcoins? Bitcoin stock markets have 
already been established years ago. Last but not least, why should it not be 
possible to grant Bitcoin credits or to apply for such? How and why should 
it not be an option that these credits become secured not by ‘real’ bitcoins, 
but only by claims to bitcoins in the same way that our book money is only 
a claim to cash and not cash itself? Especially if and inasmuch Bitcoin has a 
future, a financial market centring on exactly this will arise (cf. Maurer in this 
volume). This market will be crowded by serious Bitcoin bankers and virtual 
swindlers alike. Eventually, all of this will create the need for regulation so 
that one ultimately ends up with exactly what one wanted to avoid.
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III.
The second money reform project I would like to discuss is the concept of 
sovereign money (Huber/Robertson 2000; Huber 2011; cf. Benes/Kumhof 
2012; Sigurjonsson 2015). It aims at restricting speculation and – contrary to 
the example of Bitcoin, which calls for the marketization of money – exten-
sively nationalizing money. It is based on a simple idea: Any money held by 
bank customers in their accounts ought to be changed into, or, practically, 
be declared henceforth as being, central bank money. Private commercial 
banks could no longer just use credit transactions for the creation of book 
money at their own convenience. Rather, the capability of creating central 
bank money would be reserved for the central bank only. 
Such a restructuring of the money market would affect the actual assets 
of neither banks nor customers. After swapping book money with sovereign 
money, no one would possess more or less than previously. Positive balances 
would remain positive and debts would remain debts. The sole difference 
would be that all of it would be central bank money. A redefinition of book 
money as central bank money or, in the proponents’ language, sovereign 
money, would ‘simply’ have the effect that money stocks would also be moved 
in the field of cash-free transactions. All this is contrary to the current practice 
of merely settling payment promises with each other, which allows for an 
uncontrolled creation of new payment promises that are treated like actual 
money. Banks would, therefore, turn into exactly what laymen usually think 
them to be, i.e. financial intermediaries that, on the one hand, conduct pay-
ment transactions for their customers and, on the other – and in particular 
–, supply previously saved money for investment purposes. Banks would be 
asked to forgo their privilege of creating book money. Instead, the creation 
of money would become the prerogative of the state.
In addition to the continuing possibility of commercial banks borrowing 
money from the central bank, new money would be injected into the economy 
by leaving it up to the national government to use at its own discretion. A 
growing economy would demand an increase in the total amount of money in 
circulation. The government, or parliament, would be free to decide whether 
the additional money ought to be spent on the purchase of services, social 
contributions, lowering taxes or the amortization of debts. An inflationary 
effect of such a policy should be ruled out, if the central bank, politically as 
independent as ever, would adjust the amount of money circulating according 
to expected economic growth. Reducing the total amount of money would 
be possible by raising taxes or selling off assets that are in the central bank’s 
possession. 
Ultimately, a reform simply brought about by juridical means, is supposed 
to eradicate the speculative exuberance of the current monetary system. Of 
course, in order to be a proponent of sovereign money, one must see this 
problem to be far graver than the danger of political instrumentalization and 
the related threat of inflation. However, the diagnosis according to which 
our economic system has become more vulnerable to crises, due to its forced 
financialization, is shared by many experts (cf. Deutschmann 2005). Thus, 
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how should we judge the idea of sovereign money? What might be possible 
reasons for objecting to such a reform? In the case of Bitcoin experience has 
already been gathered. Even if assessments are partly based on speculation, 
they relate to observable trends. The same does not apply to a sovereign 
money reform. Putting it into reality would mean entering new territory. It 
would be a venture even though technically speaking its realization would 
be quite simple. Yet while so far Bitcoin only supplements the current mon-
etary order, sovereign money is intended to replace this very system. Thus, 
running through possible consequences of such a change becomes necessary 
(cf. Weber 2014, 78-82; Breton/Coudert 2016), especially because actual 
experience cannot be drawn from. 
In this context it is helpful to picture what would happen if an ongo-
ing Swiss initiative for the introduction of sovereign money were successful 
(www.vollgeld-initiative.ch). Such a change would effect the drying-out of 
an important business model: not financial intermediation, but that of book 
money creation. In order to prevent a drop in profits, compensatory higher 
credit interests or, at least, rising fees would have to follow. However, due to 
international competition, customers would hardly accept such changes. At 
least, three options would be available to banks: First, they could renounce 
domestic affairs, leave Switzerland and move abroad. Second, they could 
offer foreign currency accounts to their debtors, which involve, apart from 
exchange rate risks, better interest conditions. Third, and most probably – 
based on the history of money having been dominated by private and national 
players struggling for who gets to define money matters (Davies 2002, 29-33) 
– banks would invent alternative, money-like securities which would allow 
customers to get into debt (cf. Bryan et al. and Mader in this issue). Just as 
one cannot prevent resourceful companies from offering credits based on 
bitcoins (however, not ‘physical’ bitcoins, but claims to conditioned payments 
of bitcoins), banks would start offering what could be called book money 2.0. 
Though under particular circumstances, this money could be changed into 
sovereign or national money, a complete change would be unlikely as long 
as third parties exist who accept it in lieu of payment. National regulations 
on minimum reserves cannot prevent the functioning of a system in which 
banks create (a) new (form of) book money. Moreover, there is not even the 
need for inventing new book money. It would suffice if shares of, say, money 
market funds were treated like money. Though for players such as banks and 
their customers such proceedings are tied to a higher liquidity risk, they might 
accept them as long as indebtedness in money surrogates remains cheaper 
than that in actual money. 
From the point of view of the state or its agents, feasible and, when faced 
with all of the evasive manoeuvres mentioned above, virtually necessary 
counter-measures would imply corresponding prohibitions. Dealing in foreign 
currencies as well as dealing in surrogate currencies could be, granted that 
banks do not move abroad, legally obstructed and, if necessary, prosecuted. 
But even if there would be no opposition and no attempts of evasion, a sov-
ereign money reform would entail a heightened regulatory effort. Above all, 
not only the price level would have to be monitored, as is current practice, but 
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also the actual amount of money. However, how can the need for new money 
really be determined? What or how many investments will be successful, 
how many will fail? In all of this, central banks face two major problems. The 
first one being that the central bank authorities are less capable of gauging 
the demand for new money, i.e. credit, than an indefinite number of market 
players acting in a decentralized way (Hayek 1969). The second difficulty lies 
in the fact that from a macroeconomic perspective, all investments have to 
be financed in advance (Schumpeter 1934, 140-159). Before newly produced 
goods can be sold and a surplus value arises, machines have to be bought, 
materials obtained, and wages paid. Only in hindsight can it be determined 
whether calculations were right and whether more money actually remains 
than has been invested. However, a priori it is not only unknown, but also 
‘unknowable’, which and how many investments will generate growth. Assum-
ing that it might even be possible, an (all too) effective money supply control 
might turn out to be a dead-end brought about by central planning.
Furthermore, political conflicts between governments and parliaments 
on the one side and the central banks on the other are bound to erupt. While 
it is intended by proponents of sovereign money that a state’s debt capacity 
remains highly limited, this proposal unwittingly entails that in the case of 
surplus money, governments and parliaments would have to, by order of the 
central bank, raise taxes. The parliament’s budgetary sovereignty would thus 
be undermined. Not elected economic and social politicians would instru-
mentalize the central bank, but, quite on the contrary, independent central 
bankers would put a leash on economic and social policies. Ensuing tensions 
can currently be glimpsed when considering the example of the austerity 
measures externally forced upon Eurozone countries like Greece. 
Last but not least it is highly probable that a state that introduces sover-
eign money will sooner or later have to introduce controls of international 
capital flows. Though credit takers may move abroad, investments in ‘safe’ 
sovereign money might, especially in times of little growth and low interest 
rates, attract foreign savings. Rising demand for sovereign money on an 
international level would drive the currency’s exchange rate upwards and 
thereby lower the country’s export opportunities. To counteract such a revalu-
ation, the central bank could and should print domestic money and sell it in 
exchange for foreign currencies. However, this would increase the amount 
of money without such an augmentation having any relation to the growth 
prospects of the domestic economy. Whether such a surplus of money unre-
lated to actual demand – unrelated because it is not needed for consumption 
or investment purposes – could ever be ‘sterilized’, cannot be foreseen. In 
any case, it cannot be ruled out that the inflated amount of money, which 
had been put in place in order to counteract the pressure of revaluation, 
might eventually compromise trust in the currency’s recoverability. In fact, 
even without sovereign money, Swiss central bankers have in the past faced 
and are currently facing the problem of, on the one hand, having to throttle 
the price upsurge of the Swiss franc, without, on the other hand, stifling the 
national finance industry. If the Swiss people were to vote for the introduc-
tion of sovereign money, this dilemma would only get worse. Direct foreign 
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investments in Swiss central bank or sovereign money would only become 
more attractive than they already are. Limitations of capital movements and 
(even higher) negative interest rates would logically ensue, given that, as 
foreseen by proponents of sovereign money, the control of the total amount 
of money remains the only aim of monetary policy – instead of equally, what 
already today is the case despite the formal independence of central banks, 
pursuing and balancing different economic aims. 
IV.
The scenario described above might never come true. Prognoses are nothing but 
prognoses, and the future remains unpredictable. Unforeseen circumstances 
and unconsidered facts might eventually play into the hands of a sovereign 
money reform rather than complicating it. In any case, a sovereign money 
reform remains an experiment whose outcome cannot be known. Yet it is not 
unlikely that the reform’s answer to dangerous speculation might come at 
the price of economic stagnation. For critics of continuous growth, this might 
even be a desired outcome, but for sovereign money reformers it certainly is 
not. Furthermore, were the central banks to become as independent as the 
latter hope for, conflicts between this institution and democratically elected 
bodies in charge of taxation would inevitably ensue. Of course, the reformers 
are acquainted with criticism leveled at their venture. Nonetheless, what is 
striking, and disconcerting especially to critics that are basically in favour of 
eventually nationalizing the monetary system, is that the sovereign money 
reform is presented as a merely technical project.
Interestingly, the same holds true for the adherents of Bitcoin. For them 
the blockchain technology replaces the need for trust as well as regulation 
and simultaneously shields the value of the virtual currency from politi-
cal manipulations. Granted that Bitcoin assumes an important role in the 
execution of trade, granted moreover that, as algorithmically foreseen, the 
total amount of eventually circulating bitcoins can actually be limited, the 
unavoidable effect would be falling Bitcoin prices. Yet, it is incomprehensible 
why a Bitcoin deflation should not have the same disastrous consequences 
as the deflation of ‘real’ money has. In addition, we have seen that the need 
for trust has only been shifted from organizations to technology itself. But 
what happens when technology fails? Who is allowed to correct faults in the 
system? Moreover, who mediates and has the last say regarding quarrels 
about damages resulting from cyber attacks? Who ensures that property 
rights are respected and enforced in virtual worlds? And finally, who will 
prevent the emergence of a full-blown financial market dealing with Bitcoin 
credits and derivatives whose workings and necessary oversight will create 
private and public intermediaries similar to those that govern our fractional 
reserve banking system? 
Of course, all this is not to say that sovereign money or Bitcoin will inescap-
ably flop. On the contrary, the malfunctioning of our monetary system is too 
grave for it not to be re-regulated, the opportunities virtual currencies entail 
are too luring for them not to be seized, but there is no reason to assume 
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that a future monetary order or future monies will not be as disputed as our 
present system is. Money has been and will continue to be – be it in the form 
of Bitcoin or under the regime of ‘truly’ central banks – a political institution 
inevitably characterized by clashing interests and inconsistencies. Though 
I do not wish to glorify our current currency order as the best of all possible 
worlds, I nonetheless would like to warn against excessive hopes of having 
completely different kinds of monetary systems.
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